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Abstract
The paper aims at investigating how the organization of a certain
industry evolves once the competition among its firms, producing a ‘com-
plex’ (i.e. non-modular) product, is modeled as the intertwining of inno-
vative search and organizational change. In order to take the full roster of
participants into account, and to retain the inner complexity of their de-
cisions, a Pseudo–NK model is built–up in which a population of firms is
called to match a technological frontier. By evolving along different stages
of the sector’s life-cycle, such a kind of technological calls for a trade–off
between two strategies of cost–reduction through either outsourcing or
technological search. Overall, the simulation results confirm previous lit-
erature as, for example, in the introductory stage of the industry life–cycle,
marked by frequent and intense jumps of the technological frontier, firms
need to vertically integrate in order to have higher chances to win the
competition for a new standard. On the contrary, in the decline stage,
in which the technological frontier almost stabilizes, deverticalization al-
lows firms to better compete on costs. These results change if suppliers
are allowed to innovate, as they are more likely to lock the market in
sub–optimal configurations.
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1 Introduction
It is now a well established result that technological and organizational change
constantly interact in shaping the division of labor between and within firms,
and thus the organization of an industry. Not only is technological competition
among firms a crucial determinant of the dynamics of industries in terms of
market concentration and market behavior, not to say of rate of entry, survival
and growth of firms (Klepper 2002, Klepper and Simons 2000), but changes in
the firm’s organizational arrangements, such as vertical integration and disin-
tegration strategies, also affect their innovative outcomes (e.g. Robertson and
Langlois 1995). Moreover, both technological and organizational changes are
affected by the degree of complexity of, respectively, the product and the or-
ganization. Non-modularity (Brusoni and Prencipe 2001, Langlois 1992), for
example, poses to the firms’ process of change such complex constraints, that
they can just try to do it heuristically, by searching for satisfactory, rather than
optimal solutions.
On the basis of these arguments, the paper aims at showing that the organi-
zation of an industry can be seen as the emergent property of a complex process
of search and competition, in which the vertical scope of the firms co–evolve
with, rather than simply determine, their innovative behavior. In order to do
so, the overall institutional structure of an industry, and its changes over time,
are related to the firms’ individual behaviors by building up an agent-based
model with three specific characteristics.
First of all, we refer to an industry populated by a number of firms differ-
ing in both the capabilities to follow the technological frontier of their product
and the transaction costs they face if they decide to outsource some produc-
tion components. This allows us to provide a sound micro-foundation to the
changes occurring in the industry organization. Indeed, if all the firms of one
industry were good both upstream and downstream, no one of them would find
convenient to specialize, regardless of the potential transaction costs. On the
contrary, if firms differ in terms of capabilities, and the entailed specialization
economies outweigh the bundle of transaction costs, vertical disintegration be-
comes convenient.
Second, firms are engaged in producing a final good, made up of produc-
tion components, which affect the characteristics demanded by the consumers.
Keeping the production modules in house, that is being vertically integrated,
firms can rely on their R&D department and try to match the evolution of the
technological frontier. Outsourcing the production modules to external special-
ized suppliers, instead, allows final firms to obtain them in a more economic
way, but loosing the chance of ameliorating their technology. This allows us to
fit the organizational and the technological decisions of the firms in a trade-off
they face between the static efficiency guaranteed by a reduction in transaction
costs, and the dynamic one given by a superior technological performance.
Third, the final good produced by the firms is weakly modular, so that a
technological change in a production module brings with it a pervasive set of
changes in many of the others. In so doing we are able to retain the complexity
of the firms’ innovative and organizational decisions, and the fact that it often
leads them to sub-optimal results.
By simulating the model we aim at obtaining, as emergent properties, ‘ag-
gregated’ results for the organization of the industry, to be possibly compared
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with those obtained by other contributions trough case-studies and more qual-
itative analyses. Among the others, we are interested in relating our results to
those obtained in two strands of research. First of all, we aim at investigating
whether our results support or not the dominant view in the studies on the
relationship between vertical scope and technological change. Second, we aim
at checking whether our model replicates or not the results obtained by inves-
tigating the evolution of the innovative behavior and of the market structure
along the life-cycle of a sector.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 will briefly illustrate
the theoretical background of the paper. Section 3 will detail the rationale and
the functioning of the model. Section 4 will organize the simulation results
around the two issues we are interested in. Section 5 will conclude.
2 Innovation and the organization of industry:
the need of a complex approach
Given the complexity of the issue addressed by the paper, its theoretical and
methodological background is somehow eclectic. More precisely, four are the
research lines on which the paper draws.
First of all, an integrated approach to the determinants of the institu-
tional structure of an industry, combining transaction costs and capabilities,
is adopted. The “organization of industry”, once retained mainly an issue of
price and quality competition (Stigler 1968), is increasingly more related to the
governance of the firms’ transactions (Williamson 1975) and to the production
and innovative capabilities of the firms (Richardson 1972). In spite of the dif-
ferences between the two paradigms, an integrated approach to the issue has
been recently recommended (Williamson 1999, Nooteboom 2004). In particu-
lar, it has been argued that the distribution of production capabilities in the
relevant industry should be an explanand, along with transaction costs, of its
organizational and technological changes (Jacobides and Winter 2005).
In sticking to this combined approach, heterogeneity in production capa-
bilities is crucial in supplying, along with transaction costs, an engine to the
organization of industry and to its dynamics. This emerges clearly when the
‘black-box’ of the production function gets unpackaged and production tech-
niques within it can only be searched and chosen by evaluating the firm’s fitness
to the outer technological landscape (Kauffman, Lobo, and Macready 2000).
This is the second starting point of the paper. Following the evolutionary
perspective, we maintain that firms deal with innovation activities, as well as
with production, as bounded rational agents, resorting to research heuristics,
rather than to optimal procedures. The (local) knowledge embedded in the or-
ganisational routines of the firms (Nelson and Winter 1982), and the capabilities
and competencies to set it at work in problem–solving activities (Dosi, Nelson,
and Winter 2000), constitute accordingly a basic ingredient of our methodolog-
ical approach to the issue. This is the more so when we refer, as we do in the
paper, to firms which are engaged in ‘complex products and systems’, such as
“tailored capital goods, systems constructs and services” (Dosi, Hobday, and
Marengo 2000, p. 5). In these cases, the decision process actually becomes
complex and requires firms to draw on special cognitive models.
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Indeed, the third starting point of the paper is represented by a “Simonian”
perspective to the solution of complex problems. Accordingly, we maintain that
both the technological and the organizational changes the firms undertake are
often very complex. The number and variety of the dimensions of each problem
of change, together with the interactions among the dimensions, are so high
that the problem necessarily requires a decomposition into sub–problems. Sub–
problems are then solved independently adding another dimension to solvers
boundaries (Simon 1969). The way in which a new problem (e.g. innovation) is
posed — decomposed — and the structure of the related (collective) problem–
solving activity, therefore define another basic ingredient of our approach to
the firm’s innovative dynamics (Marengo, Dosi, Legrenzi, and Pasquali 2000).
An element which appears indeed essential when the ‘decomposability’ problem
emerges from the modular structure of the products the firm forges and of the
organizational structure it adopts in doing it.
The fourth starting point of the paper is in fact represented by the growing
literature on the issue of ‘modularity’ (Brusoni and Prencipe 2001). In fact, the
interrelations among the elements of a complex problem may be translated into
different economic dimensions: (i) a product with a modular (rather than an
integrated) architecture; (ii) an innovation in the core design concepts (rather
than in the architectural knowledge) of a certain product; (iii) an organiza-
tion whose ‘information’ and ‘compensation’ structures are loosely (rather than
strongly) coupled. Our forth basic set of elements is thus represented by both
the opportunities and the limits of modularity (Ernst 2005).
As we said in the introduction, once built up on these four pillars, the model
will be simulated and its results compared with other related evidences on the
organization of industry.
A first comparison will be made with what we know from the massive liter-
ature on the relationship innovation vertical integration/disintegration. Start-
ing from the seminal work by Robertson and Langlois (1995), the relationship
between vertical scope and technological change has been extensively debated
(Taymaz and Kilicaslan 2005).1 In general, vertical integration has been claimed
to be preferable in front of system-like innovations — but only with a stable,
or predictable demand — and in front of changes in the modules and sub-
systems of complex products. But when either technology or demand (or both)
evolves rapidly, vertical integration might actually hamper the exploration of
new solutions so that specialization and vertical disintegration become prefer-
able. And this is more the case, the more modular the products of the firms
are (Langlois 1992). Related to this, is the role played by the firm’s distance
from the technological frontier in its decisions of vertical integration (Acemoglu,
Aghion, and Zilibotti 2002). In particular, it has been argued that, by mitigat-
ing the managerial overload of production and innovation activities, vertical
disintegration might actually favor innovation, but just for firms in a neigh-
borhood of the frontier, where innovation were higher. Conversely, when firms
1Summing up, Robertson and Langlois (1995) claim that “strategic” innovations — involv-
ing a drastic rearranging of capabilities, but within known boundaries — would favor vertically
integrated firms over disintegrated ones. Conversely, a “parametric change” — occurring in
certain known variables within a known framework — and a “structural change” — where
variables and framework are both unknown — would rather favor market related mechanisms.
1Although modularity is taken into account in the model and in the simulation, we have
kept it constant in this paper. For a deeper analysis of the role of changing degrees of
modularity, see (Ciarli, Leoncini, Montresor, and Valente 2006)
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locate far from the technology frontier, imitation activities are more important,
and vertical integration is preferred.
The second set of results we will consider the role of the evolution of the
industry organization along its life-cycle. Also this issue has been massively in-
vestigated, and from both standard (i.e. contractual) (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell,
Griffith, and Howitt 2005) and non-standard (i.e. competence based) perspec-
tives (Utterback and Abernathy 1975, Abernathy and Utterback 1978). It has
been argued, for example, that different stages impact differently on vertical
integration as it can be necessary or not in overcoming the slack of market
mechanisms for innovative products and components (Foss 1993). For example,
in the introductory stage, new complex products might require an array of com-
ponents substantially different from those developed by the incumbent firms, so
that final producers might find convenient to integrate upward their suppliers
to reduce ‘dynamic transaction costs’ (Langlois 1992). But when a matura-
tion stage is reached, the increase in the demand for the newly introduced
components, along with the entry of further intermediate suppliers, makes the
development of each component relatively more autonomous, thus rendering
vertical disintegration more convenient as it reduces production costs through
specialization. This holds more true in the declining stage, when technological
change slows down and makes the interfaces among the product’s components
quite stable, while the relative competences diffuse both upward and downward.
What occurred in the computer industry is an illuminating example of this kind
of cyclical pattern (Bresnahan and Malerba 1999).2
3 The model
This section describes how we model the interaction between a technological
landscape and market organization. The model rationale, its main hypotheses
and the behavioural assumption are first discussed (Section 3.1) in the light of
the theoretical background discussed above (Section 2), to which Section 3.2
will provide a formal description.
3.1 Rationale and hypotheses
We consider a market for a product, composed by several modules, whose quality
and price depends on the quality and production/purchase costs of the modules.
Therefore, producers’ activities are oriented to improve quality and costs for
modules, under the constraints posed by available technological and economic
possibilities.
We assume that the overall strategy applied by the firms consists in contin-
uous random exploration of some of the possibilities of change of their current
2A similar account can be given by focusing on the dynamics of the ‘technological dialogue’
which occurs between supplier and customer of a certain innovation, in order to specify the
attributes of the new products and services to be introduced (Christensen, Verlinden, and
Westerman 2002). Indeed, depending on this dialogue being ‘structured’ or ‘unstructured’ —
that is, occurring or not across interfaces which are specifiable, measurable and predictable —
it is, respectively, it can be convenient or not to move such interfaces from within to outside
the firm. This is so because in the latter case, that is in the presence of an unstructured
technological dialogue, the necessary information for the efficient functioning of the market,
both from the supplier and the customer point of view, is actually missing.
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activities, and taking what appears an improvement in respect of the current
condition. In other terms, we represent firms as observing a narrow local neigh-
bourhood of their current condition and applying a myopic perspective, lacking
the possibility to make an exhaustive assessment of the whole space of possibil-
ities and evaluating all potential future outcome. This assumption, supported
by the evolutionary literature cited above, is particularly justified in our anal-
ysis. Firstly, the firms’ environment is highly complex, due to the strategic
effects caused by the presence of competitors with similar conditions, and to
the complexity of the technological landscape. Therefore, since facing a com-
plex problem, firms can safely be assumed to be aware that, even assuming a
desired optimal point may be identified, small errors in determining the starting
direction to optimality can lead to huge errors of the arrival point. Secondly,
our firms live in a competitive environment; therefore they need not only to
identify highly rewarding conditions (technological and economical), but they
also need to survive the path leading to those conditions. In other terms, even if
an optimal point could be identified, there may be no economically viable path
leading to it due to the lack of resources necessary to finance the losses incurred
during the time of adjustment from the currently held condition to the arrival
point.
The model deals with a population of firms with heterogeneous technologi-
cal endowment that seek to innovate their product in order to satisfy demand
preferences. All firms pertain to the same sector and produce one single, non ho-
mogeneous, product. The model draws on the Schumpeterian ideas that, firstly,
technological change is, to a certain extent, ubiquitous and continuous, rather
than isolated and extraordinary; secondly, that technological innovation con-
cerns also product innovation rather than process innovation. Competitiveness
is pursued, in our model, by three, related, means. Technological improvements
allows to provide higher quality products, increasing the appealing of a firm’s
offer in respect of competitors. Production costs’ savings, affected by economies
of scale and costs’ reducing learning–by–doing, and transaction costs3 Decisions
to outsource/integrate a module of the product, influencing both technological
qualities and costs. Below we describe the principles guiding the implementation
of these activities in our model.
3.1.1 Technological landscape and innovation
Firms have three ways to modify their product, i.e. to innovate: by developing
a new technology for one of the components; by outsourcing one of the compo-
nents to an external supplier; and by internalizing a currently externally sourced
component. In any case, firms take the decision of adopting the innovation or
rejecting it (maintaining the previous condition), depending on the technologi-
cal performance provided by the product, which is determined by an evaluation
of the technological state of the product in a technological landscape.
Concerning the technological landscape, we assume that exists a dynamics
(that, for analysis purposes is assumed exogenous) determining the overall per-
formance level of a given technological state. The performance is determined
by the complex interaction among all the technological states of the modules
composing a product. At any moment in time exists a technology (i.e. a state
3We ignore agency costs, which amounts to assume that agency costs affect equally all
firms and the transaction costs refer to their net effect discounting the agency costs.
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for each module) which is the state of the art, providing the highest possible per-
formance. However, the path leading to this optimal technology, that we called
technological frontier, may be quite rough. In fact, firms cannot observe the
individual technologies (one for each module) and those composing the frontier,
but only the overall performances of different combinations of modules’ states.
A firm testing an innovation of a product far from the frontier may observe a
fall in performance even if the innovation gets a module closer to the frontier4.
Furthermore, the frontier itself moves continuously, so that the performance of a
product cannot but fall continuously, unless innovation moves continuously the
firm’s technology toward the shifting frontier, generating a sort of competence–
destroying technological change (Tushman and Anderson 1986).
In line with much of the literature (see, e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982) we
assume that technological innovation is “local” and off-line. That is, an innova-
tion is tested by testing a small change in respect of a known technology, since
we assume as impractical the development of a technology radically different
from the currently used one. A tentative innovation is assigned its (techno-
logical) performance value, which depends (in a highly non-linear way) on the
distance of the tested technology from the frontier. An innovation is accepted if
the performance of the new technology is higher than the alternative, currently
adopted one.
3.1.2 Costs
The competitiveness of a firm depends on its product’s technological quality
and on its price. Prices are determined on a costs-plus bases, with a mark-up
equal for all the firms. Costs are computed independently for each module of the
product, and depend on three factors: economies of scale; learning–by–doing;
transaction costs.
Firstly, the unit costs of producing small quantities of a given module are
higher then those for producing large numbers of the same module. This effect,
as we will see, is crucial in determining the advantage of suppliers. Secondly, a
learning–by–doing effect decreases through time, other things being equal, the
cost of producing a module with a given technological state. As an innovation
is introduced on the module, the lower costs associated to the old technology
disappears, restarting a new path of learning. This effect rewards, in a sense,
the lack of innovation since it is assumed that “frozen” technologies allow for
improvements on their production methods. Lastly, we assume the existence of
transaction costs, making more costly modules acquired externally in respect
of, other things being equal, the internal production. This assumption makes
possible the externalization of modules only if: the supplier enjoys such a large
production scale to off–set the transaction costs; or/and the suppliers’ qualities
is much better than that accessible by its clients.
3.1.3 Outsourcing and integration
As we have seen, we represent firms as eager adopters of new technologies, as
soon they arrive within reach, and subject to almost “physical” laws determin-
4This is the typical property of local searches in complex landscapes (Kauffman, Lobo, and
Macready 2000), that we generate by means of a more efficient and flexible model adapt to
deal with real-valued variables rather than binary ones (Valente 2006)
7
ing the levels of costs. Concerning organization decisions, instead, we assume
that firms are very conservative, unwilling to introduce a change unless this is
robustly certified as providing an advantage. This is because we assume that
any change in the production system of a firm requires diffused and relevant
costs of adjustment that, though being one-off, need to be justified only when
the advantage is clearly assessed.
In practice we consider that a change in the production structure is accepted
when several, independent tests at different times consistently indicate that the
modification would increase the competitiveness of the firm. Firms consider
modification of their production structure one module per time. A test consists
in comparing the current competitiveness (i.e. the module internally produced
or externalized) with that generated under the hypothesis of a different, best
opposite production arrangement (externalized or internalized).
If the module under test is currently produced internally, the firms firstly
selects all potential suppliers (i.e. firms producing that module) compatible5
with its current technology. Among these, the one providing the best perfor-
mance is selected, and the resulting, hypothetical, competitiveness is compared
to the current one. If the module is, instead, already acquired from an external
supplier, the firm searches for better supplier (among those with a compatible
technology) and also tests for the competitiveness of re-internalizing the module.
In fact, even when firms have outsourced part of their production modules, they
keep on experimenting technologies on the outsourced segments of production.
It is therefore possible for a firm to discover a new technology for an outsourced
module, so that to fill the technological gap with the supplier.
The next paragraph describes formally the most relevant routines used to
implement the dynamics described above. In the following section we describe
the configurations of the model implemented and the relative results.
3.2 A formal description
The model represents an artificial economic system in which firms compete in
a consumers market by means of both internal innovation and organisational
change. Both innovation and organisational changes are influenced by the (non)
modularity that characterises the production of the consumers good. In partic-
ular, the interdependencies between the good’s components turn the technolog-
ical search into a complex task, and the organisational structure into a strategic
configuration influenced by both cost and technological (knowledge) features.
The economic system that we represent is populated by xf (f = 1, · · · , N)
‘follower’ firms. Each firm produces an heterogeneous final good, by assembling
Mj (j = 1, · · · , M˘) components (input modules). The final good is defined over a
set of yi (i = 1, · · · , I) ‘quality’ characteristics, which represent the same features
across firms. Characteristics of the final good should be thought as the implicit
use–value for consumers, in a Lancasterian way (Lancaster 1966). Therefore,
characteristics with the same features across firms defines the good (and firms)
as pertaining to a single sector. Eventually, we represent the final product as
5The test of compatibility consists in determining whether the potential supplier’s technol-
ogy is similar enough to the firms’ own technology on that module. The reason is the same
for not permitting firms to “discover” technologies far away from their current ones: too large
“jumps” in the technological space disrupt the capacity of the firm to adjust to a radically
new technology.
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a vector of characteristics yf , evaluated according to demand preferences. All
firms need to use all M˘ components, decide to produce some of them in–house
(M ι), and buy the remaining ones from suppliers in the market (Mε) — where
M ι +Mε = M˘ .
The way in which each component contributes to the final value of the good
(measured through the characteristics’ level) is thoroughly explained in our
companion paper (Ciarli, Leoncini, Montresor, and Valente 2006), to which we
address the reader interested in a higher level of details. For a more detailed
account of the way in which the complex research in non modular environments
is modelled via an emulation of the NK frameworks, through a PNK model, see
(Valente 2006).
In each period t, each firm undergoes the following main steps:
1. on the basis of the market structure, resulting from firms decisions at time
t− 1 and from their technological achievements, the demand is computed
allocating the relevant quantity to each firm;
2. firms then perform technological search, attempting to improve their prod-
uct fitness;
3. with the same aim firms reconsider the organisation of production;
4. finally, the value of their production is updated for the following period
t+ 1.
In what follows we first describe the model variables, and then the dynamics
of technological and organisational change.
3.2.1 Real variables
Given the relevance of final good’s characteristics (which are the objective of
the firms), the model is demand driven. Demand changes monotonically as a
function of good’s characteristics and price. Consumers define a target demand
D∗ = H +
1
pp
I∏
i=1
yci,t−1 (1)
and firms adapt smoothly (due to information sluggishness)
Dt = σ
dDt−1 +
(
1− σd
)
D∗t (2)
where H is a constant; p and c the aggregate preferences for, respectively,
price and quality characteristics; σd determines demand path dependency (in-
formation lags); p =
∑N
f=1 pf ·msf and yi,t−1 =
∑N
f=1 yf,t−1 ·msf .
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Market shares, msf , are determined as the relation between firms’ own com-
petitiveness χf , and the overall level of competitiveness. As for the demand, we
take into account that firms need to adapt their production capacity to demand
changes. We firstly compute the theoretical market share, ms∗f =
χf,t−1P
f χf,t−1
, to
6Product’s characteristics values are computed in the second and third fraction of period
t (see below), after innovation, and will determine the demand in the following period. Con-
sumers refer to the actual price and characteristics, which indeed depends on the market
structure in the previous period t− 1.
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which the real one adapts through time: msf,t = σ
mmsf,t−1 + (1− σ
m)ms∗f,t
(where 1− σm is the speed of adaptation of firms’ production capability).
We define competitiveness as the capability to adapt to demand features with
respect to price levels and characteristics’ values, χf,t−1 =
1
p
p
f
∏I
i=1 y
c
f,i,t−1.
We use values of period t − 1 to determine competitiveness in time t, as the
innovation of product components occurs at the end of the period, when firms
have already undergone production (any innovation results appear in the market
only after their actual completion, while production follows its daily routine).
Changes in the values of characteristics are discussed in the following section
3.2.2.
Firm specific prices for the consumers good are affected also by the organ-
isational choices taken in the preceding periods. Final prices, in fact, vary
according to the cost of components (bought in the supplier market or manu-
factured internally) p, the cost of labour w, the level of labour productivity A,
and the mark–up added to variable costs ν:
pf = (1 + νf )

wf
Af
+
M˘∑
j=1
p
f,j

 (3)
The price of intermediate goods (components) differs between those pro-
duced within the firm (M ι) and those outsourced (Mε). First, input suppliers
add a mark–up to their production, increasing the price of outsourced com-
ponents (which covers part of the transaction costs). Second, we take into
account learning dynamics and economies of scale, that may yield cost advan-
tages when specialising in the production of specific inputs, supplied to other
firms (more below on the way in which components price affect the decision
to outsource/internalise parts of the production). Hence, when bought in the
market, the input cost reflects the strategy of the supplying firm xg. Otherwise,
the cost depends on how long the firm has been using the input technology for
(learning), and on the quantity produced of that component (scale). In fact,
the period following an innovation on a component (or its internalisation), its
cost is set at the initial level bf,j . Otherwise, through time the learning process
sets in, and the cost converges to a target price p∗
j
, which itself reduces with the
increase in the production scale.
p
f,j
=


{
bf,j if Mj,t 6=Mj,t−1
p
f,j,t−1
σp + p∗
f,j,t
(1− σp) if Mj,t =Mj,t−1
if Mj ∈M
ι
(
1 + νg 6=f
)
p
g 6=f
if Mj ∈M
ε
(4)
where
p∗
f,j,t
=
bf,j
1 + θDf,j,t−1
; (5)
is the target price of firm xf for the Mj component produced internally; 1− σ
p
the learning factor (the speed at which the firm achieves to exploit economies
of scale); b is a constant; θ a parameter that accounts for the scale factor; and
Df,t−1 is the demand faced by the single module in the previous period.
10
Given the aggregate demand (Equation 2) firms then undergo their own
production Yf = D · msf . They produce using a fixed coefficient production
function, with no financial constraints, and they command the relevant quan-
tity of inputs, either to an internalised department (if Mj ∈ M
ι) or to an
external supplier (if Mj ∈M
ε). Being our main focus in this work the relation
between intermediate components features, product technological architecture
and market organisation, we simplify the production side assuming that input
coefficients are all equal to one. The effect of the different components is re-
flected in their contribution to the quality characteristics of the final good (see
following section 3.2.2). Allowing for these assumptions, the current demand for
each single component j of firm xf closes the production side; total intermediate
demand thus sums up in–house production and the component sales to clients,
ψf,j,t =
∑
g 6=f∈Ct−1
Yg,t as follows:
Df,j,t = Yf,t + ψf,j,t (6)
where g is any buyer firm pertaining in time t− 1 to the set of clients C of firm
xf . It goes without saying that when a module is outsourced, its production is
nil.
3.2.2 Internal product innovation
Once concluded the market transactions (defined in period t− 1) firms undergo
internal innovation in order to increase their competitiveness (χ) in the market,
by improving the quality characteristics of their final good.7
Internal innovation mimics the exploration dynamics on a complex techno-
logical landscape using a slightly modified version of the PNK model described
in Valente (2006). In sum,8 in each period firms attempt to twist the value
ξj of one randomly drawn product module Mj , and evaluate the result on the
product fitness (which, we recall, reflects market preferences) defined as:
φf =
I∏
i=1
ycf,i (7)
In fact, the value of each module mj contributes linearly to the final value
of each characteristic:
yi =
M˘∑
j=1
αi,jmi,j (8)
(where αi,j is the contribution of module j to characteristic i);
and it reaches its maximum level when the position of its element ξj on the
multidimensional technological landscape is complementary to the other inter-
dependent ξl 6=j
9
7Note that, once completed the production process, both product innovation — that affects
competitiveness through technological factors — and organisational changes — that affect
competitiveness through both technological and cost factors — will affect market transactions
only from the following period t+ 1.
8An exhaustive discussion on the model’s properties, found in Valente (2006) for its original
version and in Ciarli, Leoncini, Montresor, and Valente (2006) for a similar modified version
applied to a market, is skipped in this venue.
9The number of dimensions, and the intrinsic complexity of research, is given by M˘ .
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mj = exp
(
κ (ξj − µj)
2
)
(9)
given the technological architecture of the good (aj,l)
µj =
∑
l∈ℵj
aj,lξl + cj (10)
µj thus accounts for the level of (non) modularity of the product, the techno-
logical interdependence between modules; where aj,l = [−1, 1] is the effect of
the position of ξl on the value of mj ; κ is a constant that allows to change the
support of the Gaussian function; ℵj is the set of the l = 1, · · · ,M 6= j modules
interdependent with mj ;
10 and cj should be interpreted as the technological
frontier that firms attempt to approach:
cj,t = µt −
∑
l∈ℵ
aj,lµt (11)
where
µt =
{
µt−1 + ζ with probability Z
µt−1 with probability 1− Z
(12)
follows a non negative linear increase with small variations ζ = υ · ω, where
ω is a parameter tuned to test the effect of different increasing magnitudes of
technological change (shift in the technological frontier); Z is a parameter tuned
to consider the effect of the pace of technological change (periodical changes in
the frontier); and υ ∼ U [0, 1].11
Note that the technological frontier does not define a ceiling, but rather the
fitness of the cardinal position ξj of each component. Indeed, the continuous
(exogenous) change of the technological landscape requires firms to adapt their
past technological configuration, in order to catch up with competition. This
may have effects on the organisational structure, such as when firms outsource
too many units of production and loose control on the relation between product
architecture and technological change.
As mentioned, firms may produce both for the final and the intermediate
market. Firms enter the market fully integrated, producing the final product and
every component. In the baseline model we make the strong assumption that
components suppliers cannot innovate on single modules sold in the intermediate
market — i.e. they become fully dedicated to production.12 Eventually, the
innovation routine describes as follows:
10Note that when ℵj is an empty set the technological problem faced by firms is very simple,
like the case in which K = 0 in NK models. As we show in Ciarli, Leoncini, Montresor, and
Valente (2006), it is straightforward to demonstrate that the higher the aj,l, the more difficult
is the research on the technological landscape, and the more likely the event of technological
lock–in. This is even more the case when aj,k < 0.
11In order to avoid results conditional on a unique type of technological change (linear
increase), we have controlled also for a technological frontier that follows a random walk
(υ ∼ U [−1, 1]) obtaining very similar results. Nonetheless, note that the difference between
a linear and a stochastic technological frontier can be interpreted as, respectively, the so–
called competence–destroying and competence–enhancing technological change (Tushman and
Anderson 1986).
12Instead, producers using a component only internally can change its technological prop-
erties. Nonetheless, we will show how results differ when this assumption is relaxed.
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1. each firm xf randomly draws one module M˜f,j with equal probability 1/M˘
(i.e. independently on whether they are outsourced, sold, or produced only
for internal use);
2. if M˜f,j is sold in the intermediate market (ψf,jM˜ > 0), besides being used
for its own product, the innovation step is skipped.
3. in any other case the firm attempts to improve its technology following a
random search strategy,13 through the following three steps:
(a) explore: changes the position in M˜f,j on the technological land-
scape through a local search, by randomly drawing a new ξ∗f,j ∼
U [ξf,j − δ, ξf,j + δ];
14
(b) test: compares the initial fitness of the good φf , with the fitness
attained after the technological change, φ∗f ;
(c) innovate: accepts the technological change if the new configuration
yields a higher fitness (φ∗f > φf ) and ξf,j moves to ξ
∗
f,j .
We stress once more that, due to the way in which the technological land-
scape is represented, a change in the position of one module on the landscapes
affects the performance of the remaining modules (µl) — depending on the ar-
chitectural structure (given by the aj,l) — but not their position ξl. Hence,
a technological change in period t influences the following innovation path.15
Note also that up to now we have been considering only the technological fit-
ness, in terms of quality characteristics, as the price is not influenced by product
innovation.
Three more aspects are particularly relevant, as they influence also the de-
cision of internalising/outsourcing bits of the production chain. First, we are
assuming that firms undergo innovation also when they do not manufacture the
component directly. Therefore, repeated successful changes on an outsourced
module may induce the firm to internalise it in the future, as it has attained
a higher/better suited technological performance. Conversely, given that firms
start with different technological configurations (random distribution of ξj),
firm specific innovation patterns may attract producers that are willing to out-
source part of their production. Finally, any change in a module (when success-
fully completed) restarts the learning process that allows to take advantage of
scale/specialisation economies (Eq. 4). Given that costs have an important role
in the decision of outsourcing the production, technological change may both
reduce the probability of being selected as an intermediate supplier and increase
the probability of outsourcing the module (if a really cheaper one is found). But
it can also attract firms for which the new component becomes technologically
attractive (outweighing the higher price with respect to competing suppliers).
The final outcome depends on a wide number of interaction within the market,
that can be shown only through simulation techniques.
In order to have a better grasp on the above considerations, we move to
explain the organisational choice in the model.
13See Valente (2006) for a discussion on the differences between search strategies.
14Where δ represents the maximum achievable span of a single step technological change.
15More details on this relevant aspect in Ciarli, Leoncini, Montresor, and Valente (2006).
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3.2.3 Organisational change
No matter the result of the innovation process, in each period firms evaluate also
their organisational structure. Each firm initially randomly draws one particular
Mˆf,j with probability 1/M˘ . The subsequent process then differs depending
on whether Mˆf,j is currently produced in–house or acquired in the market.
Indeed, in both cases of integration and outsourcing we take into account that
a change in the organisational structure requires a thorough consideration of
the opportunities, and cannot take place simply because firm fitness benefit a
one shot marginal increase. Thus, a firm decides to integrate (outsource) an
external (internal) component only when a positive opportunity has occurred
repeatedly (i.e. for a given number of periods, recursively).
We start from the outsourcing algorithm.
Outsourcing
In brief, each firm first checks whether it can find a supplier that produces a
better input, at a similar technological level, and eventually outsources the pro-
duction of the component. As mentioned above, the firm may find a specialised
supplier that has reduced its costs exploiting economies of scale, or a compo-
nent that fits better its product architecture. The outsourcing routine has the
following dynamic:
1. exploration: the firm xf initially searches whether there are firms selling
the component Mˆf,j on the intermediate market;
2. if there are, it selects the x′g 6=f producers that have attained a similar
technological position ξf,j
Mˆ
for that module, such that |ξf,j
Mˆ
− ξg,j
Mˆ
| <
γ;16
3. if no supplier is eligible, the outsourcing step is skipped;
4. else,
(a) test: the firm tests its competitiveness when using the outsourced
input with the new technology ξg,j
Mˆ
and cost p
g,j
and compares the
initial fitness φf/p
p
f with the new one φ
∗
f/p
∗p
f ;
(b) if the test is negative (φf/p
p
f < φ
∗
f/p
∗p
f ), no outsourcing occurs;
(c) else,
i. the firm considers how many outsourcing attempts ε it has al-
ready performed in the past;
ii. after a given number of positive attempts (i.e. tests after which
the firm would have outsourced) (ε > $), the firm decides to
buy the component from the selected firm;
iii. else (ε < $), postpone the decision to a following period, keeping
track of the positive test.
16We use for γ the same value of δ, which defines the innovation possibilities for a firm in
one single step
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Internalising
If the selected module Mˆf,j is already outsourced, the firm first searches for a
better supplier, and then considers the opportunity of integrating its production
anyway. The search for a new supplier follows exactly the outsourcing routine
described above, to which we address the reader. Though, as mentioned, the
producer xf may have attained a high technological level on Mˆf,j , as a conse-
quence of a series of successful technological innovations. The internalisation
routine then goes as follows:
1. test: the firm tests its competitiveness when producing the component
in–house with respect to both the technological position achieved ξf,j
Mˆ
and its cost p
f
and compares the initial ‘outsource’ fitness φf/p
p
f with
the new one φ∗f/p
∗p
f ;
2. if the test is negative (φf/p
p
f > φ
∗
f/p
∗p
f ), the firm keeps buying the mod-
ule on the market (either the previous or the new supplier);
3. else,
(a) the firm considers how many attempts to internalise ι it has already
undergone in the past;
(b) after a given number of positive attempts (i.e. tests after which the
firm would have internalised) (ι > $), it decides to integrate the
component, exploiting its technological advance, and increasing the
chances to follow the changes in the technological frontier;
(c) else, it postpones the decision to a following period, keeping track of
the positive test.
The technological and organisational changes undergone in the second part
of each time period t define firms and market conditions at the beginning of the
following period t+ 1.
In order to close the model, the following variables are updated: the value
of quality characteristics yf,i,t, which determine both the average market value
yf,i,t and firms competitiveness χf,t; and the demand faced by each module
Df,t−1.
4 The results: technological change and the dy-
namics of industrial organization
The goal of the simulation is to discuss the effects of technological innovation on
the dynamics of industrial organization. We believe that the relationship runs
in both directions: also the economic events arising in an industry influence
the levels and rate of changes of a technology. These two phenomena generate
a complex feedback loop between technology and industrial organization. For
obvious reasons of simplification of the analysis, however, we ignore the links
from economic phenomena to the technological possibilities. This assumption
allows a clear understanding of the other direction, since we can study how
different (exogenous) technological dynamics influence industrial organization.
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For a similar reason, we also apply another, highly unrealistic but method-
ologically necessary, assumption: we prevent entry and exit of firms. This
assumption permits to avoid that the results are influenced by demographic
phenomena and, crucially, removes an extremely relevant and peculiar source
of innovation: innovative new entrants. These lack, by definition, entrenched
technological and production conditions, limiting the scope of choice. But face
the problem of establishing themselves on the market, requiring relevant initial
investment. Modelling new entrants would require a high number of largely
arbitrary assumptions, potentially obscuring the phenomena generated by the
dynamics of incumbents, and therefore we prefer, in this initial exploration of
the model, leaving aside the problem of entry.
It is worth noting that these two simplifying assumptions concern heavily
related aspects. In fact, we may expect that, for example, when incumbent
cannot (or prefer not to) be close to the technological frontier new entrant will
be more likely manage to squeeze into the market to exploit the technological
possibilities not tapped by incumbents. Conversely, when incumbent are at, or
near, the cutting edge of the technological possibilities new entrant will have lit-
tle possibilities to enter a market with strong qualitative advantages. Therefore,
the two (supposedly related) phenomena of determinants of the technological
frontier and entry/exit are likely to affect the state of a market in different ways
than those generated by the incumbents’ activities. To study this latter phe-
nomenon we therefore ignore the former, considering the setting described in
the following.17
We consider a market for an unspecified product, whose production process
entails several phases, or, equivalently, is composed by a set of modules. We
consider a number of firms, all of them engaged in offering this final product
to the market of consumers, but being free to determine whether to produce
internally all the modules, or purchase one or more of them from an external
supplier (chosen always among the members of the industry). Starting from an
arbitrary initial condition, we will discuss the events leading the industry’s firms
to strike their balance between the trade-off they continuously face regarding
costs (e.g. internal production vs. outsource) and “quality”, represented by the
technologies of the modules used to assemble the final product.
Our major focus will be on the average number of modules produced inter-
nally by the firms. Generally speaking, higher level of integration allows, other
things being equal, a relatively easier discovery of technological improvements,
since firms can tailor the innovation on each of their module to the rest of their
technologies. However, the existence of a large number of integrated firms pre-
vents the exploitation of the economies of scale that may be arising from a few,
large producers for each module. On the other hand, a disintegrated market,
where much of the total production is produced by acquiring components, is
likely to be cost effective, but also to limit the scope of innovation. In fact, sup-
pliers selling their modules to a large number of (heterogeneous) users are likely
17Isolating phenomena on the basis of logical distinction, though not of empirical evidence,
is a normal methodological step, after which it is expected the extension of the analysis by
merging the different strands of research providing a unique, more realistic, representation.
To this extent, it is worth to note that our representation and the model design adopted is
easily compatible to the endogenization of the technological frontier dynamics and to consider
entry and exit of firms. We obviously preferred to implement a manageable, but less realistic,
partial model, rather than implementing a undecipherable (apparently) complete model.
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to suffer limitation in changing their offer without introducing incompatibilities
in respect of a sizable portion of their customers. We expect this aggregate ten-
sion to be generated by the micro-behaviour representing firms’ activities, and
the solutions to the indications of the effects of movements of the technological
frontier. In the following, we provide a more detailed description of the settings
used.
4.1 Model setup
We represent a group of 50 firms competing on the same consumers market,
and following technological change rather than inducing it. Firms differ only
with respect to the initial position of each component on the landscape (ξf,i,j),
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution centred on the initial level of the
technological frontier (µ).18 Firms produce a two characteristics good (yi), using
six components (Mj), all interdependent (ℵj = {1, · · · , 6 6= j}), with a medium
level of non–modularity (average |ai,jl 6=j | = 0.46). This setting amounts to
define a relatively “messy” technological landscape, at an intermediate level
in between a smooth, Fuji-like landscape and a rough, multi-peaked one. In
practice, most of the points of the landscape admit a path away from local
peaks, though this path may be narrow and tortuous.
In the first period, at the beginning of the simulation runs (t = 0), firms are
fully integrated, and supply an equal share of the market (msf = 1/50). This
simplifying assumption allows to avoid that erratic initial conditions determine
the final results. Innovation strategy is random and local (δ = γ = 0.05), while
firms have perfect information on suppliers and choose the best one. Organisa-
tional change (integration/externalization) is quite slow and firms require five
consecutive positive responses to the same strategy before actually adopting it.
Firms respond to an exogenous demand with unitary elasticities for both
price and quality preferences (p = ci = 1,∀i respectively), and adapt slowly
to both demand changes and production adjustments (σd = sigmam = 0.9
respectively).
Demand preferences (for characteristics) change implicitly as the technolog-
ical frontier moves — think of a group of localised firms that follow the techno-
logical change induced by innovative competitors. The rate (Z) and magnitude
(ω) of change of the frontier are the crucial elements on which the following
results are discussed. They allow to suggest some answers to the hypothesis
reviewed in the second section, and to show how the incentives listed at the
beginning of this same section affect market organisation. The technological
frontier increases monotonically (0 < ν < 1).19 We analyse industrial organi-
sation dynamics in four different technological environments (Table 1), each of
which is understood as a particular phase of a product life–cycle.
18Se also Table 3 for specific parameter values.
19Note that the hypothesis on the direction of change of the frontier may apply only to
certain — probably the majority of — markets/sectors. A monotonic change implies that
previous competencies/technologies that defined consumers goods become obsolete and never
recover (no space for modern vintage). Nevertheless, we have checked results also for a random
frontier (−1 < ν < 1), finding no relevant differences. Results, not included for space reasons,
are available from the authors.
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Table 1. Typified technological environments: Patterns of the
technological frontier and product life cycle
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
XX
Frequency
Amplitude
Large innovations
(high ω (= 0.1))
Small innovations
(low ω (= 0.001))
Frequent innovations – High turmoil – Low turmoil
(high Z (= 0.5)) – Standard research – Standard definition
Infrequent innovations – Low stability – High stability
(low Z (= 0.01)) – End of standard – Mature product
4.2 Discussion
We run four groups simulations, aimed studying the cases for frequent or infre-
quent movements of the technological frontier, and for small or large steps of
the same dynamics. We start presenting results produced under the assumption
that firms selling a module on the market for intermediate products are not able
to innovate this module. Later, we will replicate the same simulations without
this limiting assumption. In order to smooth away the effects of randomness, we
will present (unless otherwise specified) average values over multiple simulations
with the same specifications and different pseudo-random values.
4.2.1 Non cumulative dynamics
Large and frequent technological change
A technological environment in which the frontier undergoes both frequent and
large changes can be associated to the stage in which firms compete for the
definition of the technological standard for a new product, such as the computer
industry in the early 1990. Under those settings we show that, starting from
a condition of full integration, firms in the consumers market tend to remain
highly concentrated, and outsource only a marginal part of the production (see
Figure 1, top series).
Such behaviour is very similar across firms, suggesting that, starting from
very similar conditions, there is only one winning organisational strategy. In
fact, the cross firms variance of the number of internalised components, low since
the beginning, reduces through time (Figure 2, bottom series). In Figure 8 in
the Appendix we show that, on average, firms end up outsourcing at maximum
two modules, and a large part recover to full integration.
Two explanations account for these results: although initially some of the
firms have an incentive to outsource some of the module (presumably those gen-
erating a very poor quality), intermediate suppliers promptly remain locked in
the learning process of technologies that become outdated in a very short time.
As soon as suppliers fall too far behind the technological frontier (and clearly so
does the buyer, for that component) in–house production results become com-
petitive, since they can be ameliorated, in contrast to externalized components.
Secondly, appealing only to a small portion of the producers, suppliers of in-
termediate products cannot ripe the costs’ advantages deriving from economies
of scale, which are therefore dwarfed by transaction costs. As a result, as soon
18
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Figure 1: Evolution of the average number of integrated product components (mod-
ules): the four technological environments
as the qualitative advantage disappear, firms that initially externalize modules
promptly re-internalize it.
Nevertheless, when firms catch up with the technological change, they have
again an incentive to outsource a module, until the short–sighted strategy reveals
non competitive. This cyclical behaviour of the industry can be appreciated in
Figure 1.a in Appendix, where we show results from a single run, as opposed to
the multi–runs average — which flattens away the single run cycles. The same
shows for the cross–firms variance (Figure 10.a). Quite interestingly, organiza-
tional dynamic in this case also shows long waves of organisational changes.
The model also shows that, across simulations, firms outsource always the
same components, while, for others, intermediate trade barely occurs,20 since
almost all firms prefer to produce them internally. In other terms, our model
differentiates modules that characterize each firm specific nature, from others
that are generally traded off-the-shelf from global suppliers. Which module falls
in which category is here less important than understanding how this can occur.
As we already said, a module is externalized if there exists a potential supplier
with similar technologies selling its product at a cheaper price. If, by chance, a
producer can supply one of its module to many customers (because, by chance, it
happens to be compatible with products from many producers), then economies
of scale kick in and a large intermediate market for the module emerges. Cus-
tomers of this market will then be able to concentrate their innovative efforts
on the other modules, as required by the large and frequent movements of the
technological frontier. The largely traded module cannot be advanced, becom-
20Results for which figures are not shown, for reasons of limited space, are available from
the authors.
19
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 0  2000  4000  6000  8000  10000
Va
ria
nc
e 
of
 in
te
rn
al
 m
od
ul
es
Time
Cross-firm variance in internal components
Large frequent tec change
Small frequent tec change
Small infrequent tec change
Large infrequent tec change
Figure 2: Evolution of the cross–firm variance in the number of integrated product
components (modules): the four technological environments
ing, sooner or later, the bottleneck of further innovations. When this stage is
reached, gradually the customers of this intermediate market starts to internal-
ize the module in order to adapt it to the advancement introduced on the other
modules. The first firm that manages to do the trick (advancing the technology
of “laggard” module), becomes immediately attractive for the other customers
of this already established market.
Given the high interdependency among modules, not all components can
follow this pattern, because this would prevent any innovation at all. Therefore,
only one or two modules can play this role, becoming, in a sense, the standard
of the product, since all other components need to be adapted to this one. As
any standard, its modification is rare, occurring only as very last resort after all
other potential ways to improvements have been saturated.
As far as the market structure is concerned, shares in the consumers market
are relatively concentrated (Figure 3, top series), provided that firms differ only
with respect to the initial position on the technological landscape, and adopt the
same random innovation strategy.21 Results are better appreciated looking at
the market shares evolution for a single simulation run (Figure 11.a in the Ap-
pendix). High concentration appears in the market shares of firms that manage,
time by time, to catch–up with the frontier. The kind of technological change
we are referring to creates in fact a continuous turmoil of temporary oligopolies.
The firm that reaches the frontier obtains a sort of Schumpeterian monopolistic
share, that is eroded and eventually wiped out as the competitive advantage
shifts to other firms. Furthermore, the same kind of change determines a high
21The initial spike is due to the fact that some firms start with better technological condi-
tions, and gain temporary oligopolistic positions.
20
probability of failures in catching–up, which translates in the presence of a tier
of numerous firms whose market share remains quite low.22
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Figure 3: Evolution of market concentration in the consumers market (Herfindahl
index): the four technological environments
Large infrequent technological change
The case in which relevant technological changes occur rarely can be associated
to a stage that precedes the search for a product standard (bottom left of Ta-
bles 1). A disruptive transition between a long lasted mature product, and a
completely different product that encompasses numerous innovations (think for
example at the leap from typewriters to personal computers, through different
generations of electric typewriters).
Although the technological frontier moves linearly, the industrial organisa-
tion cycles abruptly (Figure 1). These radical changes are better appreciated
from a single run case (Figures 9.c and 10.c) where we show that the industry
may steeply turn from a relatively de–verticalised condition (where firms, on
average, outsource more than a half of the components) to a quite concentrated
one (where firms, on average, produce five out of six components in–house).
The case of large but infrequent technological change in the frontier rein-
forces the above considerations on firms incentives to (dis)integrate. If techno-
logical change slows down in destroying the competencies of established firms
in the consumers market, they have time in–between different shocks in which
they can look for advantages of specialisation. On average, the organisation of
22Having ruled out entry and exit, the most these firms can do is to compete in a lower
profile niche of the market, and from time to time they have the chance to pick–up a favourable
modules’ setting that allows them to catch–up again at very late stages.
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industry is now more disintegrated, but when the frontier places a large gap with
firms’ technology, they need to integrate to undergo modular R&D. Nevertheless
organisational strategies may differ between firms, as the higher variance (and
its high oscillations) shows (Figures 2, second series from the bottom and 10.c).
Although most firms end up with, on average, four components produced in–
house, some firms produce only three components, and others up to five (Figure
8, bottom left).
Also in this case firms choose specific components that are largely produced
in–house, while only two of them (the less strategic ones for the product archi-
tecture) are almost always outsourced.
Quite interestingly, the market structure changes radically with respect to
the previous case, and turns into middle–high competitive (Figure 3, first series
from the bottom), i.e. very low concentrated. Focusing on a single simulation
run (Figure 11.c), the turmoil in the market shares persists, but the lower fre-
quency in technological change allows the sector to spread, from time to time,
in a distributed number of market shares. In these time spans, competition
turns from innovation–based to cost–based. Furthermore, the lower frequency
of technological change makes the tier of firms unable to catch–up less numerous.
Small frequent technological change
When the technology changes frequently but with small steps, we can think of
the stage in which a product standard has been eventually defined, and firms
attempt marginal product improvements and process innovation (which are not
addressed in this paper).
Under these conditions the vertical scope dynamics is now characterised
by smoother cycles, and the incentive to take advantage of economies of spe-
cialisation are much greater. On average firms outsource half of their product
components, and reintegrate them only occasionally (Figure 1). Even when con-
sidering a single simulation run (Figure 9.b), we obtain quite small oscillations
in the number of internal components.
This is due to the fact that the continuous change in the technology occurs
close to the exiting competences of firms, and cost advantages of specialised
suppliers outweigh the loss from not being exactly on the frontier. The result
is in line with the empirical evidence that shows that firms that maintain prox-
imity to the technological frontier, tend to specialise on a limited number of
components. Nevertheless, not all firms follow the same strategy, resulting in
a high variance in the number of integrated components (Figure 2, third series
from the bottom). Their number is almost uniformly distributed among firms,
ranging from two to four (cross simulation average in Figure 8, top right).
The counter effect is that the average quality of the good on the market does
not reach its maximum level. Notwithstanding, results show that a sector with
a defined standard is characterised by a level of high competition (Figure 3,
second series from the bottom) with continuous changes in firms’ market shares
(see market shares from a single run in Figure 11.b). Also in this case a low tier
of firms with small market share emerges. But due to the low intensity of the
technological change, this niche of weak competitors is relatively less numerous
than the high tier of the market, which is instead distributed among a large
number of firms.
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Small infrequent technological change
Finally, the case of a rare and small technological change is clearly that of a
mature sector. When a sector is invested by small and low–frequency techno-
logical shocks specialisation and cost advantages become the relevant factors.
Firms are always near to the technological frontier, and although modularity is
low, once adapted the components technology to the product architecture, the
main incentive for firms is to reduce production and transaction costs (tech-
nological transaction costs are almost nil). Therefore, the sector shows a very
stable pattern of middle–high disintegration (Figures 1, bottom series and 9.d).
Nonetheless, this is the case in which firms may find the wider amount of
options to sustain the competition. The variance of the internalised modules is
the highest (Figure 2, top series), and firms may compete by producing in–house
only one component or four of them (Figure 8, bottom right).
The corresponding market structure is more concentrated, and reaches only
a middle level of competition, inferior to that observed in the previous two cases
(Figure 3). Non negligible degrees of oligopoly are now obtained by those firms
which better manage to exploit the advantages of cost competition, but are able
initially to find the ‘right’ pattern of innovative research (which then remains
stable) (Figure 11.d).
4.2.2 Innovative suppliers
We explored the results of the model under a variety of conditions. We report
here a few results providing some further possibility of comments. The same
configuration producing the results above has been tested allowing suppliers of
intermediate modules (those firms selling also intermediate components) to in-
novate these parts of the products. When intermediate firms can fully innovate
on marketed components, technological change sums up to economies of spe-
cialisation. Therefore, there is very little trade–off between cost and technology
strategies. Firms that innovate first, also start learning in advance and acquire
economies of specialisation: they become attractive for firms that prefer to out-
source their production, as they were less successful in innovating.23 Nonethe-
less, the trade–off between innovating — thus starting the learning process from
scratch — and reducing production costs with the acquired technology through
learning, is still at work. That is, if suppliers are able to innovate, and acquire
economies of specialisation before the buyers have the time to end their contract,
they cumulate successful outcomes. When this is the case, as expected, the level
of disintegration is in general higher, regardless the technological environment
(Figure 4).
This has to do also with the fact that the innovativeness of providers allows
buyers a further alternative to catch–up with technological change. In fact, inno-
vations sustained by suppliers do not substitute for internal R&D. Firms, hence,
now have an incentive to outsource most of the components, exploit competi-
tors technological advance, and concentrate innovation on internal components.
Indeed, this is the rational of ‘true’ outsourcing as compared to ‘simple’ subcon-
tracting, which is a pure cost strategy. Note also that technological outsourcing
is possible because firms produce a good with the same architecture. Eventu-
23Recall that here successful should be considered as an ex–post evaluation, as technological
search follow a random strategy.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the average number of integrated components (modules), the
variance across firms, and market shares concentration: the four technological envi-
ronments
ally, given the different initial conditions on the technological landscape, not all
firms follow the same search strategy. Therefore, given the low level of modu-
larity, very small mismatches in the technological advance of each component
are critical for the overall fitness of the good. When the technological frontier
experiences continuous and large movements, even if suppliers may innovate,
firms need to keep an integral control of R&D, as shown in Figure 4. With
respect to the previous case of non innovative suppliers, the industry is thus
more de–verticalised only to a small extent. The model also shows that in both
cases (with and without innovative suppliers) the components that are seldom
outsourced are the same ones; those most strategic in the product architecture.
This consistency between outsourcing strategies disappears in the other tech-
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nological environments: in the case of innovative suppliers all components are
equally outsourced24.
With innovating intermediate firms the model results show that the patterns
of changes in the vertical scope are much smoother; the organisational cycles
fade away, since once a supplier is identified, it takes time for the buyer to
substitute for it. The only exception being with large and frequent changes in
the technological frontier. Nonetheless, as Figure 4 shows the variance between
firms organisational choice is quite larger.
When looking at market concentration, we find out that if intermediate sup-
pliers innovate, the environment is less competitive in the case of large and
frequent technological shocks. In fact, the risk of technological lock–in with an
ever–changing frontier is high: firms that find since the beginning the ‘right’ pat-
tern of the technological standard never have an incentive to outsource strategic
components, as well as they may not be required (and bought) by competing
buyers.25 A closer look to the actual market shares shows that the market splits
in two different tiers of firms since the very early periods: winners and losers.
And no firm from the lower tier of the market is able to recover and catch–up.
With respect to the other three technological environments, the level of market
concentration is quite similar to the case in which suppliers do not innovate on
marketed components. However, the concentration is characterised by increas-
ing oscillations. With technologies smoothly changing, the market undergoes
continuous turmoil.
4.2.3 Summing up
The industrial organisation that emerges in the different, typified, technological
environments, implies a relation between the pace of technological change and
firms organisational strategies. As already discussed in the literature, products
with an integrated architecture induce firms to control the technological be-
havior of a number of its components. The extent of vertical integration then
depends on how stable are technology and demand, regardless the cost of market
transactions.
In Figure 5 we show the effect of the magnitude and frequency of technolog-
ical change on the cross–firm average number of internal components, given the
level of interactions between components.26 The corner extreme conditions show
the outcomes discussed above, in the different technological environments that
characterise different stages of a product life–cycle. Otherwise, the results from
our model only partially confirm Robertson and Langlois (1995) hypothesis.
First, when technological changes are very predictable (either the magnitude
or the frequency is sufficiently low), firm externalise most of the production. Sec-
ond, as suggested by Robertson and Langlois (1995), firms tend to cut down
their vertical composition when magnitude and/or frequency of technological
change lay in a wide contour of their average values. The higher their value, the
lower the vertical integration. Still, under those conditions of quite high tech-
nological instability, firms, on average, produce in–house approximately three
24Results available from the authors.
25Recall that firms may outsource a component only to firms that have attained a similar
technological level on that component. Hence, firms that manage to create a technological gap
with respect to competitors on a given product component, clearly do not have an incentive
to outsource, and their component may not be acquired.
26Under the condition that suppliers may not innovate on marketed components.
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Figure 5: Technological change and firm organisation. Relation between the average
number (and their cross–firms variance) of in–house components and magnitude (ω)
and frequency (Z) of technological change
quarters of their components (between four and five out of six total compo-
nents). Third, the extent of vertical integration, as shown above, increases
again up to almost fully integrated firms when technological change magnitude
and frequency reach their maximum level. Finally, quite interestingly, there is
whole area of the parameters space, with either smooth and/or quite rare tech-
nological shocks, within which firms also reach their maximum level of vertical
integration. This is due to the fact that, while too large jumps in the techno-
logical frontier leave most of the firms with outdated components (becoming
complete followers, and dependent on the available components), in relatively
stable — though continuously changing — technological environments, all firms
keep up with the competition, and need the control over all components. In
other words, technological advantages are still reachable, and pay off more than
cost advantages.
Eventually, as shown in bottom rows of Figure 5, high vertical integration
conditions are the most stable across firms. Conversely, in the large area of not–
so–high integration, with a relatively unstable technological environment, the
variance across firms behaviour is quite high. With an average of four integrated
components, some firms retain only two, while other are fully integrated.
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Those results suggest that the relation between modularity and vertical in-
tegration is somehow more complex. Once taken into account transaction costs,
modularity is only one condition of the industrial organisation dynamics, even
if a necessary one. When dealing with an integrated architecture good, our
results confirm that the distance from the technological frontier is an important
explanatory condition, which complements the modularity hypothesis.
Both conditions define the organisational behaviour of firms along the dif-
ferent phases of a product life cycle (Table 2). The phases are characterised by
alternative technological conditions. Initially (bottom left) a completely new
product (a prototype) is proposed on the market. We refer to this phase as a
transitory one, occurring between the end of a mature product and the begin-
ning of the race to define the new product standard.
Table 2. Typified technological environments: Patterns of the
technological frontier and product life cycle
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
``
Frequency
Amplitude
Large innovations
(high ω (= 0.1))
Small innovations
(low ω (= 0.001))
Frequent innovations I II
(high Z (= 0.5)) Standard research Standard definition
→
↑ ↓
Infrequent innovations IV(Pre I/Post III) III
(low Z (= 0.01)) New product Mature product
The following phase (top left) is then characterised by a continuous change in
the technological definition of the product, mimicking the research for a product
standard. Once a product emerges as a standard, firms shift to incremental
innovations, continuously changing the definition of the product (top right).
Finally, the product ends in the mature stage (bottom right) where technological
changes induced by firms are rare and small. We take for granted that at this
stage the product life cycle reaches an end; the next transition from the third
stage to the first one implies the definition of a completely new good.
In Figure 6 we present results from a simulation where we exogenously mod-
ify the frequency and dimensions of shocks affecting the technological frontier.
The four phases indicated in the graphs refer to the four values affecting the
frontier in Table 2. This exercise shows how industrial dynamics (both as or-
ganisational change and market concentration) emerges in the different phases
of a product life cycle.
If we consider the case of non innovative suppliers, firms start to integrate
when new products are initially proposed on the market (Phase IV). The be-
haviour is highly cyclical — and quite different across firms (Figure 6, bottom
left) — until firms start to compete to define a standard for a new product
(Phase I), when the technology is continuously, and largely, updated. At the
beginning of the standard definition, some firms are able to acquire higher mar-
ket shares, which are suddenly eroded during the standard definition. Once
the product technology has been defined, and only incremental (although fre-
quent) changes occur, a smooth process of disintegration characterise the indus-
try (Phase II). Though, the organisational strategy is now much more diverse
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Figure 6: Evolution of the average number of integrated components (modules), the
variance across firms, and market shares concentration: the four technological envi-
ronments
among the competing firms. The industry definitely stabilises, with constant
organisational structure, market concentration and cross–firms variation, during
the maturity stage of the product, when innovation become rare and incremen-
tal.
Considering suppliers that innovate on the intermediate goods, during this
last stage the market concentrate on firms that have innovate (and organised)
more successfully.
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5 Concluding remarks
The paper has investigated how organization and structure of an industry evolve
over time once the competitive behaviour of its firms is modelled by retaining
some crucial elements of ‘complexity’, which do not usually enter in the stan-
dard analysis. First of all, firms follow search heuristic, rather than optimal
behaviour, in making choices about their technological level and their organi-
zational structure (namely, their vertical scope). Second, in these choices they
are asked to solve a continuous trade-off between exploring something new in
search of dynamic efficiency and exploiting something known in search of static
efficiency. In order to retain these elements, we have built up and simulated
an agent–based model. In it firms produce a complex good by using a modular
technology in terms of components, and are continuously required to update
their technological competences. By simulating this model, the paper is able to
reproduce some stylised facts of industrial dynamics whose micro–foundation is
usually quite qualitative and based on case–studies.
At the outset, we got confirmations that the specific stage of the life–cycle of
a certain industry matters, affecting its dynamics as a result of the technological
and organizational choices of the firms. In the introductory stage, a general
pattern of high vertical integration emerges, as it represents the most convenient
way to deal with the competition for a new standard. The industrial structure
of the sector shows high levels of concentration, but the monopolistic power
shifts continuously in a sort of Schumpeterian pattern of creative destruction.
In the maturity stage, instead, when a standard is obtained, a disintegration
pattern allows the exploitation of cost advantages rather than the upgrading of
the current technological profile, which change more gradually. What is more,
the market structure becomes quite competitive as cost competition is relatively
less selective than the technological. These results are quite robust with respect
to the innovative behaviour of intermediate suppliers.
Remarkable differences instead emerge relative to the role of the technolog-
ical frontier. Still confirming the results of the literature on the topic, when
technological discontinuities are quite consistent and leave incumbent firms far
behind, vertically integration turns out the only viable solution to catch–up.
But the pattern of vertical integration diminishes in the neighbourhood of the
current technological competences.
The last part of the paper deals with the introduction of two elements in
order to complete the picture. Indeed, with the presence of innovative suppliers,
smoothers dynamics somehow emerge, as the trade–off between outsourcing
and technological search looses importance, leaving more space for economies of
specialisation. Finally, a life–cycle model can be depicted if the different phases
are combined to mimic a sort of dynamic war for standards, which calls for high
levels of organisational/technological change from the firms side.
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A Tables
Table 3. Parameters values: initialisation and benchmark configuration
Parametera Description Value
f Number of firms xf 50
i Number of characteristics yi 2 ∀f
j Number of modules per characteristic mj = M˘ 6 ∀f
M ιt=0(1) Number of internal modules M˘ ∀f
ℵj Set of modules mi,l6=j interdependent with mi,j {1, · · · , 6 6= j} ∀f
p Price consumer preferences 1
ci Characteristics consumer preferences 1
σd Demand smoothing parameter 0.9 ∀f
σm Market share smoothing parameter 0.9 ∀f
H Constant demand 100
D(1) Initial demand 150
msf (1) Initial market share 0.02
wf Firm specific labour cost 5 ∀f
Af Firm specific productivity 2.6 ∀f
p
f,j
(1) Initial input cost 5 ∀f
Df,j(1) Initial demand for each component 0 ∀f
νf Firm specific mark–up on unitary input costs 0.1 ∀f
κ Defines the width of the Normal function for the computation ofmi,js -2 ∀f
bf,j Unitary price of inputs, after innovation/internalisation /on/of com-
ponent j
5 ∀f
1− σp Speed at which learning reduces the cost of internalised components 0.05 ∀f
θ Economies of scale 0.12 ∀f
δ Maximum innovation step (mutation of a module position) 0.05 ∀f
ξi,j(1) Initial value of ξi,j RND (98, 102) ∀f
αi,j Contribution of mi,js to yi RND [0.1, 0.9]
b∀f, i
µ(1) Initial value of the technological frontier 100 ∀j
ai,j,l 6=j Relation between two interdependent modules j and l in affectingmi,j RND (−1, 1)
c∀f
υ Random change in the technological frontier ∼ U [0, 1] ∀f
ω Magnitude of increase of the technological frontier Table 4
Z Pace of increase of the technological frontier Table 4
γ Maximum technological difference between buyer and supplier when
a component is outsourced
0.05 ∀f
$ Number of positive attempts required before undergoing an organisa-
tional change
5 ∀f
aInto parenthesis the number of lags of the initial value for lagged variables.
bAverage value is 0.33210.
cGiven that firms produce the same good, they all have the same interaction structure be-
tween components (each module interacts with the remaining five). Average of |a| = 0.46082;
Min(a) = −0.86632; Max(a) = 0.86087. See Figure 7 for the distribution of a’s.
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Table 4. Organizational dynamics and technological change: average
number of integrated modules
Technological frontier dynamics
Large Small
ω = 0.1 ω = 0.001
Non–innovative Frequent Z=0.5 low dis & mid dis &
intermediate long waves small freq cycles
sellers Infrequent Z=0.01 mid dis & mid-high dis &
large & freq cycles stable ind. str.
Innovative Frequent Z=0.5 low dis & high dis
intermediate small freq cycles smoothly incr.
sellers Infrequent Z=0.01 high dis & high dis &
incr. infreq jumps stable ind. str.
Key:
Disintegration degreea
High: 1-2.5 internal modules
Medium: 2.5-4 internal modules
Low: 4-6 internal modules
Benchmark case
aTotal modules (product components) = 6
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Figure 8: Cross–firms distribution (histograms) of the number of integrated compo-
nents in the last period of the simulation (t = 10000): the four technological environ-
ments.
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
4.64
4.98
5.32
5.66
6
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
2.66
3.495
4.33
5.165
6
a: Large frequent tec change b: Small frequent tec change
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
2.74
3.555
4.37
5.185
6
1 2500 5000 7500 10000
2.62
3.465
4.31
5.155
6
c: Large infrequent tec change d: Small infrequent tec change
Figure 9: Evolution of the average number of integrated components (modules) (all
environments): one simulation run (red) and cross–simulations average (black)
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Figure 10: Evolution of the variance of the number of integrated components (modules)
(all environments): one simulation run (red) and cross–simulations average (black)
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Figure 11: Evolution of consumable producers market shares (the four environments):
one simulation run
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